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Arnaud Mehl1




This paper investigates the extent to which the slope of the yield curve in emerging 
economies predicts domestic inflation and growth. It also examines international financial 
linkages and how the US and euro area yield curves help to predict. It finds that the domes-
tic yield curve in emerging economies contains in-sample information even after control-
ling for inflation and growth persistence, at both short and long forecast horizons, and that 
it often improves out-of-sample forecasting performance. Differences across countries are 
seemingly linked to market liquidity. The paper further finds that the US and euro area 
yield curves also contain in- and out-of-sample information for future inflation and growth 
in emerging economies. In particular, for emerging economies with exchange rates pegged 
to the US dollar, the US yield curve is often found to be a better predictor than the domes-
tic curves and to causally explain their movements. This suggests that monetary policy 
changes and short-term interest rate pass-through are key drivers of international financial 
linkages through movements at the low end of the yield curve. 
 
Key words: emerging economies, yield curve, forecasting, international linkages 
JEL classification number: E44, F3, C5 
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Tässä työssä tutkitaan, kuinka hyvin tuottokäyrän muoto ennustaa inflaatiota ja talouskas-
vua kehittyvillä markkinoilla. Työssä selvitetään myös, voidaanko Yhdysvaltain ja euro-
alueen tuottokäyriä käyttää kehittyvien talouksien kehityksen ennustamiseen. Tulosten 
mukaan sekä lyhyen että pitkän aikavälin ennusteita tehtäessä on hyödyllistä käyttää kehit-
tyvien talouksien omia tuottokäyriä, vaikka inflaation ja talouskasvun persistenssi otettai-
siinkin huomioon. Myös estimointijakson ulkopuolella ennusteet paranivat tuottokäyriä 
käyttämällä. Tulosten erot eri maiden välillä näyttävät riippuvan markkinoiden likviditee-
tistä. Myös Yhdysvaltain ja euroalueen tuottokäyrät auttavat ennustamaan kehittyvien talo-
uksien inflaatiota ja kasvua sekä estimointijakson aikana että sen jälkeen. Etenkin sellaisis-
sa maissa, joiden valuutta on kytketty dollariin, Yhdysvaltain tuottokäyrä ennustaa inflaa-
tiota ja kasvua paremmin kuin näiden maiden omat tuottokäyrät. Tämän tuloksen mukaan 
rahapolitiikan muutokset ja lyhyiden korkojen välittyminen ovat avaintekijöitä kansainvä-
lisessä rahataloudellisessa integraatiossa. 
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1  Introduction 
 
In the last two decades, international financial markets have integrated to an extent un-
precedented in history. This process has profound implications for the transmission of 
shocks, both across financial asset prices and to the real economy. 
In this respect, the body of literature on the role of asset prices – including interest 
rates, stock returns, dividend yields and exchange rates – as predictors of inflation and 
growth is large and clearly of interest to policy making.1 As highlighted in a recent survey 
of this literature (Stock and Watson, 2003), one of the main objects of study, and the one 
which has proved most useful for forecasting, is the slope of the yield curve. It has attraced 
particular interest of late, as its inversion in the US triggered a lively debate on whether it 
signaled a recession. In this context, the usefulness of the slope of the yield curve as a pre-
dictor of future growth has been challenged forcefully (Greenspan, 2005; Estrella, 2005a 
and 2005b; Bernanke, 2006). 
A salient trait of the literature is the strong emphasis it places on the US economy. 
And indeed, international evidence has remained scarce and limited to a handful of other 
industrial countries. Evidence for emerging economies has been virtually nil, in particular, 
for the very reason that domestic bond markets have started to deepen significantly only 
since the turn of the millennium (IMF, 2002, 2003, 2005 and 2006; Mehl and Reynaud, 
2005; Jeanne and Guscina, 2006). To my knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to in-
vestigate in a systematic and comparative manner the usefulness of the slope of the yield 
curve as a predictor of both inflation and growth in an array of emerging economies. 
But the key contribution of the paper lies elsewhere. Quite strikingly, the literature 
has paid little attention to international financial linkages so far, perhaps due to its focus on 
domestic developments in the US. Possible linkages include the ability of the US or euro 
area yield curve to help predict inflation and growth in emerging economies, in particular. 
Another example is the potential spillovers from the US or euro area yield curve to the 
yield curves of smaller, possibly emerging, economies. Clearly such issues are of growing 
policy relevance, given the recent emphasis on global financial issues and spillovers in the 
ongoing discussions on the future of the international monetary system and the IMF 
 
1 The use of financial prices as business cycle indicators dates back as far as Burns and Mitchell (1935) who in-
cluded both stock prices and interest rates in a list of leading economic indicators. Arnaud Mehl     
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(IMFC, 2006). Again, only a couple of studies have touched on these issues (Plosser and 
Rouwenhorst, 1994; Bernard and Gerlach, 1998). Those earlier contributions ignored infla-
tion and focused on a small number of industrial economies.2 Yet, as regards the slope of 
the yield curve, international financial linkages are also pronounced – if not more so – for 
emerging economies. Their small economic size makes the US or euro area a possible de-
terminant of their domestic inflation and growth. For this reason, the yield curve in the US 
or euro area can be expected to have some predictive power also for inflation and growth 
in emerging economies. These can further be expected to convey better information on the 
future impact of common shocks, since the US and euro area debt security markets are 
more liquid than those of the emerging economies. Finally, the US dollar or euro is given a 
prominent role in the exchange rate policy of many of these economies. This magnifies the 
pass-through from US or euro area policy interest rates to their domestic interest rates. This 
in turn contributes to potential co-movements between the slope of the yield curve in the 
US or euro area and the slope of the domestic yield curve. 
This paper makes four contributions to the existing literature. First, it examines the 
usefulness of the slope of the yield curve as a predictor of domestic inflation and growth 
using a sample of 14 emerging economies over the last decade. Second, it investigates 
whether the slope of the yield curve in the US or euro area helps predict inflation and 
growth in these economies. Third, it tests whether the information contained in the yield 
curve of some of the emerging economies stems from the US or euro area yield curve in 
the first place. Lastly, it tests whether movements in the emerging market yield curves that 
are purely country-specific contain useful information for future inflation and growth be-
yond that already embodied in foreign-driven movements.  
The paper finds that the domestic yield curve has in-sample information content in 
emerging economies, even after controlling for inflation and growth persistence, at both 
short and long forecast horizons. Moreover, adding the yield curve to a simple autoregres-
sive process often improves out-of-sample forecasting performance, suggesting that it in-
cludes genuine information for forecasting in real time. There are also signs that differ-
ences across countries are linked to market liquidity. In examining international financial 
linkages, the paper finds that the US or euro area yield curve has in-sample information 
 
2 A very recent (unpublished) research project conducted under the supervision of Campbell Harvey dwells on 
the usefulness of the US yield curve to predict growth in a small number of emerging economies (China, Korea, 
Mexico and Taiwan). However, it does not resort to formal statistical tests and ignores inflation. It also looks at 
graphical correlations between the US yield curve and the yield curve of other industrial economies, thereby ex-
cluding emerging economies (Alpha Team, 2006). BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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content for future inflation and growth in emerging economies and that it often improves 
out-of-sample forecasting performance. In particular, for emerging economies with ex-
change rates pegged to the US dollar, the US yield curve is often found to be a better pre-
dictor than these economies’ own domestic curves and to causally explain their move-
ments. Lastly, movements in the emerging market yield curves that are purely country-
specific often contain no residual information content, in particular for future growth. All 
in all, the results, which are resilient to a number of robustness checks, suggest that mone-
tary policy changes and short-term interest rate pass-through are key drivers of interna-
tional financial linkages through movements at the low end of the yield curve. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature, highlighting the contribution of the paper. Section 3 presents the methodology 
and data, and Section 4 describes the results. Section 5 provides some robustness checks 
and interprets the results. Section 6 concludes and cites areas for future research. 
 
 
2  Related literature 
 
2.1  Predictive role of the yield curve in industrial countries 
 
Empirical evidence that an inversion of the slope of the yield curve signals a recession da-
tes back to the early 1990s in the US (see, e.g., Mishkin, 1990a, 1990b; Estrella and Har-
douvelis, 1991). The standard economic rationale for this finding is that the slope of the 
yield curve is a monetary policy indicator. Monetary tightening results in short-term inter-
est rates that are high relative to long-term interest rates. In turn, high short-term interest 
rates contribute to slowing the economy (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992). Lower long-term 
yields may further reflect lower real yields, due to expectations of slower output growth 
(see e.g. Arnwine, 2004), which leads to further lowering of the yield curve at the long end 
of the maturity spectrum. In line with this, the yield curve has predicted every post-war re-
cession in the US, with only one false signal, prior to the credit crunch and slowdown in 
production of the late 1960s (Estrella, 2005b).3
 
3 In particular, the yield curve inverted before both the 1990-91 and 2001 recessions. In early 2006, the yield 
curve also inverted shortly ahead of mounting signs of an economic slowdown in the US. Arnaud Mehl     
 
The yield curve as a predictor and emerging economies 
 
  10
                                                
The reliability of the yield curve as a predictor has been challenged recently. 
Greenspan (2005) argues that many factors can affect its slope, including the gap between 
near-term and long-term inflation expectations or near-term and long-term risk premia. 
Yet, all these factors do not have similar implications for future growth. For instance, as he 
recalls, the yield curve flattened sharply from 1992 to 1994, shortly before the US econ-
omy entered its longest expansion of the post-war period. In his view, a flattening of the 
yield curve might well also signal a deceleration in inflation accompanied by a favourable 
growth outlook, e.g. once the impact of an adverse oil price shock has dampened. Like-
wise, a decline in distant-horizon risk premia might indicate that investors are willing to 
bear more risk. In such a case, a flattening of the yield curve may indicate an easing of fi-
nancial conditions, which stimulates future growth.4 Beyond the US, evidence on the abil-
ity of the yield curve to help predict future growth for other countries has so far been 
scarce and limited to a handful of other industrial countries so far (Plosser and Rouwen-
horst, 1994; Bonser-Neal and Morley, 1997; Kozicki, 1997; Estrella and Mishkin, 1997; 
Estrella, Rodrigues, and Schich, 2003). Overall, the results tend to confirm that the slope of 
the yield curve has predictive power for growth in these countries as well, at least in-
sample. 
A number of studies, including some of those mentioned above, also consider the 
predictive value of the slope of the yield curve for inflation. According to the Fisher equa-
tion, the nominal interest rate reflects market expectations of both future inflation and the 
real rate for a given maturity. The slope of the yield curve should therefore reflect expected 
changes in inflation and, in line with this, Mishkin (1990b) finds predictive content of the 
US yield curve for domestic inflation. Jorion and Mishkin (1991) as well as Mishkin 
(1991) reach similar conclusions with a sample of 10 industrial economies. However, 
much of this early work, which claims to find predictive content, did not control for lagged 
inflation. But inflation is highly persistent and once lags are included, the marginal predic-
tive power of the yield curve, i.e. the information content of future inflation over and above 
that embodied in past inflation, is reduced drastically, as shown in Bernanke and Mishkin 





4 Bernanke (2006) concurs in saying that the inversion of the US yield curve of early 2006 is not necessarily a BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 18/ 2006 
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2.2  (Absence of) evidence for emerging economies 
 
Reflecting on the scarcity of comparative evidence available on the role of the yield curve 
as a predictor for inflation and growth, Stock and Watson concluded their survey of the 
literature by saying that the “universality [of this issue] is unresolved” (Stock and Watson, 
2003, p. 801). In particular, evidence for emerging economies has been virtually nil, for the 
very reason that bond markets have started to deepen significantly only since the turn of 
the millennium. The development of domestic debt security markets in these economies in 
the very recent years reflects their efforts to self-insure against ‘sudden stops’ and reversals 
in international capital flows following the string of crises of the 1990s (IMF, 2002, 2003, 
2005 and 2006; Mehl and Reynaud, 2005; Jeanne and Guscina, 2006). Indeed, from a mac-
roeconomic perspective, domestic debt markets were seen by policy makers in emerging 
countries as an alternative source of financing to cushion against lost access to external 
funding. Moreover, from a microeconomic perspective, deeper domestic debt markets were 
expected to extend the menu of instruments available to address currency and maturity 
mismatches, which reduces the risk of financial crisis. For all these reasons, local authori-
ties have engaged in deliberate efforts to develop domestic debt markets. Reflecting these 
efforts, the stock of domestic debt securities issued by emerging economies has almost 
doubled relative to GDP in the last ten years, to more than 40% in 2004. Many economies 
have managed to extend debt duration and even place issues with long maturities (Mehl 
and Reynaud, 2005; Jeanne and Guscina, 2006). With the passage of time, data on long-
term domestic interest rates – and benchmark yield curves – have now become more wide-
ly available. 
 
2.3  International financial linkages 
 
More importantly, a striking feature of the literature is that it pays little attention to interna-
tional financial linkages, perhaps due to the heavy focus on US domestic developments. 
Yet, financial markets have become increasingly integrated internationally, although the 
nature of this integration and the transmission channels are not always well understood. A 
 
signal of a recession to come.  Arnaud Mehl     
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growing strand of literature has attempted to analyse international financial spillovers. But 
this literature has largely ignored the slope of the yield curve.5
In particular, the possible spillovers from the slope of the yield curve in the US or 
euro area to the slopes of yield curves of smaller, eg emerging, have not been considered. 
The same holds true for the ability of the slope of the US or euro area yield curve to predict 
inflation and growth in these economies. However, these issues are of growing policy in-
terest. They feature prominently in the ongoing discussions on the future of the interna-
tional monetary system and the IMF mandate. For instance, as indicated in the last Com-
muniqué of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the Board of Gover-
nors of the IMF, the Fund’s surveillance should have “a new focus … on multilateral is-
sues, including global financial issues, and especially the spillovers from one economy on 
others” (IMFC, 2006). 
Again, to my knowledge, only a couple of studies have touched on these issues. 
Plosser and Rouwenhorst (1994), using time series techniques, find evidence that the slope 
of the US yield curve significantly helps predict growth in both Germany and the U.K. 
(and vice versa). Bernard and Gerlach (1998), using probit estimation, find that the slope 
of the yield curve in the US and Germany significantly helps to predict recessions in other 
G7 countries, the UK and Japan in particular. Those earlier contributions have two notable 
features, however. First, they have ignored inflation altogether. Second, and more impor-
tantly, they focused on a small number of industrial economies. Yet, when it comes to the 
slope of the yield curve, international financial linkages are also pronounced for emerging 
economies. Their small economic size makes the US or euro area a possible determinant of 
their domestic inflation and growth. For this reason, the yield curve in the US or euro area 
can be expected to have some predictive content also for inflation and growth in emerging 
economies. It can further be expected to convey better information on the future impact of 
common shocks, given that the US and euro area debt security markets are more liquid 
than those of the emerging economies. Lastly, the US dollar (or euro) is given a prominent 
role in the exchange rate policy of many of these economies. This magnifies the pass-
through from US or euro area policy interest rates to their domestic interest rates. In turn, 
this contributes to potential co-movements between the slope of the yield curve in the US 
 
5 For instance, Hamao, Masulis and Ng (1990), King, Sentana and Wadhwani (1994) as well as Lin, Engle and Ito 
(1994), detect some spillovers from the US to Japanese and UK equity markets, both for returns and in particular 
for conditional volatility. Moreover, the seminal papers by Engle, Ito and Lin (1990) and Andersen and Bollerslev 
(1998) find strong spillovers in foreign exchange markets. A recent contribution by Ehrmann, Fratzscher and BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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or euro area and the slope of the domestic yield curve. And indeed, recent evidence from 
Frankel et al. (2004), Shambaugh (2004) and Obstfeld et al. (2005) suggest that countries 
with pegged exchange rates follow base-country interest rates more than countries with a 
float, in particular if they have lifted capital controls. In other words, having fixed ex-
change rates forces countries to follow the monetary policy of the base country. 
 
2.4  Contribution 
 
Against this background, this paper makes four contributions to the existing literature. 
First, it makes use of a sample of 14 emerging economies to investigate the usefulness of 
their yield curve slopes as a predictor of domestic inflation and growth over the last dec-
ade. Second, it investigates whether the slope of the yield curve in the US or euro area 
helps to predict inflation and growth in these economies. Third, it tests whether the infor-
mation contained in the slope of the yield curve of some of the emerging economies stems 
from the yield curve in the US or euro area in the first place. Lastly, it tests whether move-
ments in the emerging market yield curves that are purely country-specific contain useful 
information for future inflation and growth beyond that already embodied in foreign-driven 
movements. In other words, the paper assesses the extent to which monetary and financial 
conditions in the US or euro area, as captured by the yield curve, spill over to the emerging 
market world. In essence, it is closest to Chinn and Frankel (2005) who analyse spillovers 
from US interest rates to the industrialised world. Their evidence indicates that short-term 
nominal interest rates have been largely driven by the US although, since the advent of 
Monetary Union, long-term real rates in the US and euro area have tended to influence 
each other. This paper innovates on two grounds relative to them by moving the analysis 
from (i) interest rate levels to the slope of the yield curve and (ii) the industrialised world 






Rigobon (2005) looks at money, bond, equity markets and exchange rates in the United States and euro area and 
also finds substantial international spillovers, both within and across asset classes. Arnaud Mehl     
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3  Methodology and data 
 
3.1  Econometric specification 
 
To investigate the usefulness of the slope of the yield curve in emerging economies as a 
predictor of domestic inflation and growth, I follow the standard methodology surveyed by 
Stock and Watson (2003). The slope of the yield curve, denoted , is defined as the dif-
ference in period t between the yield on the long-term domestic government bond (in local 
currency), denoted  , and that on the short-term domestic treasury bill (in local currency), 









t t r r X − ≡    
 
Inflation and growth, the two variables to forecast, are both denoted  . They are initially 
defined as the growth rate over the next month of the consumer price index (cpi) and the 
industrial production index (ipi), respectively 
t Y
) / ln( 200 , 1 or   












where the factor of 1,200 standardises the units to annual percentage growth rates.
6
 
(i) In-sample measures of predictive content 
Predictive content is measured with a linear regression relating the future value of Y to the 
current value of X. There is an important caveat to bear in mind, however. If the Ys are se-
rially correlated, which is typical for inflation and growth (both being fairly persistent vari-
ables), their own past values are useful predictors themselves. Therefore, it remains uncer-
tain that the slope of the yield curve offers marginal predictive content, i.e. embodies in-
formation beyond that already captured in past values of inflation and growth. Moreover, 
other past values of the slope of the yield curve might have predictive power as well. As 
suggested in Stock and Watson (2003), this leads to a linear regression in which lagged 
values of both   and   appear:  t X t Y
                                                 
6 Note that, due to limitations arising from the time span of my data (around 10 years), I discarded real GDP, 
which is available at the quarterly frequency only, as this would have left a small number of degrees of freedom. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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T k u Y X Y t
p
i i t i k t t ,... 0 1 0 1 0 1 = + + + = + = − − + ∑      α β β    
 
where  0 β , 1 β , s i α   are unknown parameters,   an error term and where the maximal 
lags are of order T and p, respectively. If 
1 + t u
0 1 ≠ β , the k
th lag of the slope of the yield curve 
can be used to forecast the value of inflation or growth. This equation applies to forecasts 
1-period ahead but is straightforwardly extended to multistep-ahead forecasts. To that end, 
 is replaced with the corresponding h-period ahead value, with cumulative growth or 
inflation over the next h months being defined respectively as 
1 + t Y
) / ln(
200 , 1
    and
) / ln(
200 , 1


















in annual percentage rates. Following again Stock and Watson (2003), the h-step ahead 
forecasting regression which uses the k
th lag of the slope of the yield curve can be written 
as 




i i t i k t
h
h t ,... 0
0 1 0 = + + + = + = − − + ∑      α β β   (1)
 
Since the data are overlapping by construction, the error term in (1) is serially correlated 
(and contains a moving-average term of order h-1). For this reason, the test of predictive 
content based on (1), i.e. the test of  0 1 = β , needs to be computed with consistent standard 
errors using the Newey and West (1987) correction for heteroskedasticity and autocorrela-
tion (Plosser and Rouwenhorst, 1994).7
An additional caveat to bear in mind is that the slope of the yield curve may reflect 
– on top of an expected inflation and real yield component – a risk premium component, 
which would weaken its predictive power. To the extent that the latter does not vary over 
time, it is picked up in the constant term  0 β , however. Yet, the risk premium may well be 
time-varying. For instance, there is evidence that the decline in long-term bond yields in 
the euro area has recently been driven largely by declining term premia, which explains 
                                                 
7 The correction ensures that the covariance matrix is both consistent and positive semi-definite. An alternative 
specification is to use k lags of X in (1), possibly removing insignificant ones, although interpretation becomes 
more challenging. The selected specification has the advantage of readily providing an estimate of the response of Arnaud Mehl     
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their historically low levels. In turn, this could also explain why the plain spread between 
long-term and short-term interest rates seems to have lost much of its predictive power for 
future real GDP growth, so that correcting for risk premia variations improves forecasting 
power (Werner, 2006). A further implication is that a fall in risk premia leading to a flat-
tening – and possibly an inversion – of the yield curve that coincides with an acceleration 
in inflation or growth may lead to a negative estimate for  1 β , contrary to what standard 
theory would predict. In a similar vein, supply shocks may also flip the sign of the correla-
tion between yield curve slope and inflation. Hardouvelis and Malliaropulos (2004) find 
evidence that the slope of the US yield curve is negatively related to the future level of in-
flation for horizons between one quarter and one and a half year ahead (which is close to 
this paper’s forecast horizon). Using a general equilibrium model of a monetary economy 
with sticky prices, they explain this as resulting from of consumption smoothing in connec-
tion with a permanent positive productivity shock, which simultaneously increases con-
sumption and output and reduces prices. 
 
(ii) Pseudo out-of-sample measures of predictive content 
Pseudo out-of-sample forecasts are tantamount to real-time forecasting simulations. Esti-
mation is carried out by resorting only to data available prior to the forecast. As such, it is a 
yardstick to stress test whether the slope of the yield curve is genuinely useful for predic-
tion. Following again Stock and Watson (2003), a standard way to measure pseudo out-of- 
sample forecast performance is to compute the mean squared forecast error of a candidate 
forecast (denoted forecast i), relative to a benchmark (denoted forecast 0). Here, I use the 
autoregressive part of (1), as benchmark and the full model as the candidate forecast. This 
measures whether the slope of the yield curve is better than a simple AR process as a pre-
dictor of inflation and growth, and so has marginal out-of-sample forecasting power. Let 
h
t h t Y + , 0 ˆ  and 
h
t h t i Y + , ˆ be the benchmark and ith candidate pseudo out-of-sample forecasts of 
, using data through time T
h
h t Y + 1 – 1. Then, the h-step ahead mean squared forecast error 
(MSFE
h) of the candidate forecast, relative to that of the benchmark forecast, is 
                                                                                                                                                    
future inflation and growth to past changes in the slope of the yield curve. The latter, which can be also used as a 
rule-of-thumb when taking the yield curve as a leading indicator, is of clear relevance from a policy perspective. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 















































where T1 and T2 – h are respectively the first and last dates of the pseudo out-of-sample 
forecast (so that forecasts are made for dates t = T1 + h,… T2). If the relative MSFE
h is less 
than unity, then the candidate forecast is considered to outperform the benchmark.  
The statistical significance of the difference in forecast performance is tested with 
the Diebold-Mariano (1995) statistic. Taking the pair of squared forecast errors from the 
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The test statistic is calculated for the 6-month ahead forecasts (with forecast error series of 
24 – 6 = 18 observations).8  
 
 
                                                 
8 I could not calculate the test statistics for 12-month and 18-month ahead forecasts, as these would produce too-
small forecast error series, with 12 and 6 observations, respectively (see, e.g. Harvey et al. 1997, Table 1 p. 285, 
who do not report the results of their size tests on the standard Diebold-Mariano and their modified Diebold-
Mariano statistics for forecasts 8 periods ahead and above and with less than 16 observations). Estimating the 
models with a shorter time period prior to out-of-sample forecasting is clearly not a solution, as this would likely 
result in inconsistent estimates, especially for those countries whose data sample starts fairly late in the 1990s and 
barely spans a full business cycle. Arnaud Mehl     
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(iii) International financial linkages 
To test for the existence of international financial linkages, I first replace the slope of the 









i i t i k t
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h t ,... 0     
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*
1 0 = + + + = + = − − + ∑ α β β   (2) 
The specification measures the predictive power of the slope of the yield curve in the US 
and euro area for future growth and inflation in emerging economies. Note that having 
both  t X  and  on the right-hand side of the equation would result in a misspecification, 
as these are potentially collinear (see below a discussion of equation 3). As mentioned 
above, this predictive content may stem from (i) the larger economic size of the US or euro 
area, which makes it an important component of foreign demand; (ii) the deeper US or 
euro area debt security markets, which leads to a greater ability of its yield curve to convey 
information on the future impact of common shocks; and (iii) the prominent role played by 
the US dollar (or euro) in the exchange rate policy of many of these economies, which 
magnifies the interest rate pass-through. The MSFE criterion is used to test whether the 
slope of the yield curve in the US or euro area is a better predictor of inflation and growth 




Subsequently, I test whether part of the information contained in the slope of the 
yield curve of some of the emerging economies stems from the yield curve in the US or 
euro area in the first place. To this end, I instrument the slope of the yield curve in an 
emerging economy by that of the US or euro area. The fitted series, denoted   captures 
the movements in the slope of the yield curve of the emerging economy that are explained 
by movements in the slope of the yield curve in the US or euro area or by common shocks. 
t X ˆ
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h
h t ,... 0      ˆ
0 1 0 = + + + = + = − − + ∑ α β β   (3) 
To assess whether correlations between yield curves can be – in some instances – 
interpreted as causal, I also use Granger causality tests to detect signs that the US or euro 
area curve is exogenous. 
Lastly, I add to the regression the residual of the first-stage regression (which can 
be interpreted as a country-specific component) when the US or euro area yield curve is 
found to be a satisfactory instrument. This allows testing of whether all the information BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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contained in the slope of the yield curve of the emerging economy stems from the yield 
curve in the US or euro area in the first place. Denoting this residual as t ε , yields 




i i t i k t k t
h
h t ,... 0      ˆ
0 2 1 0 = + + + + = + = − − − + ∑ α ε β β β   (4) 
where  0 2 = β  suggests that country-specific movements in the emerging market 
yield curve have no residual information content for future inflation and growth beyond 
that contained in foreign-driven movements and 0 2 ≠ β  indicates that they contain some 
information. 
An alternative way to approach the issue would be to use a dynamic factor model to 
estimate global and country-specific unobserved components in the dynamics of emerging 
economy yield curves. However, the US or euro area yield curve can be regarded as a sig-
nificant part of this global component already, and my methodology has several advan-
tages. First, the US or euro area yield curve is observable and interpretable. Second, using 
it allows me to focus on its forecasting power and to relate my paper to the earlier literature 
directly. Third and last, a disadvantage of factor models is that the estimated components 
are statistical constructs, which raises challenges for interpretation. 
 
3.2  Data 
 
My sample includes 14 emerging market economies, namely: Brazil, Czech Republic, 
Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, South Africa and Taiwan. Data for the consumer price index, industrial produc-
tion index, and slope of the yield curve were taken from the Bank for International Settle-
ments, Bloomberg and Global Financial Data. The slope of the yield curve is defined as the 
difference between the yield on the 5-year domestic government bond in local currency 
and that on the 3-month treasury bill in local currency. In particular, the 5-year maturity 
was the longest one common to all the countries (see Table 1 for an overview).9 Due to 
availability constraints, exceptions for the long end include Brazil (for which I use the 
yield on the 3-year domestic government bond in local currency), Mexico (3-year domestic 
government bond in local currency) and Taiwan (10-year domestic government bond in 
                                                 
9 I also take German rates as a proxy for euro area rates, both at the long and the short end of the yield curve. 
Admittedly, since the advent of the euro, the money market swap rate has increasingly gained benchmark status 
at the short end of the maturity spectrum. However, it is available only since 1999 only, which would have Arnaud Mehl     
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local currency). Likewise, exceptions for the short end include Korea (3-month time de-
posit rate, as sovereign issuance of money maket instruments has been scarce) and Taiwan 
(1-month treasury bill yield). Also due to data scarcity in emerging economies, the long-
term yields are not always derived from zero-coupon bonds. Moreover, the maturity of the 
benchmark bond is occasionally not strictly constant, although it is always that closest to 
the reference maturity. Lastly, data on the long-term interest rate for the Philippines pertain 
to the primary market (unlike the others, which all refer to secondary market prices). 
Table 2 reports selected descriptive statistics on the data. The median inflation rate 
is around 4.8% per year, which hides some dispersion across the sample. Inflation is virtu-
ally nil in both Hong Kong and Singapore, reflecting the deflationary period which fol-
lowed the Asian crisis, as well as in Saudi Arabia; conversely, it reaches double-digit fig-
ures in Mexico and Hungary, possibly reflecting the periods of macroeconomic instability 
experienced by both countries in the sample period. Moreover, inflation is least volatile in 
Korea, with a standard deviation of about 1 percentage point, and most volatile in Mexico, 
with a standard deviation of about 8 percentage points. The median industrial production 
growth rate stands at around 4.7% per year, with also some dispersion across the sample. 
Real production decreased over the sample period in both Hong Kong and the Philippines, 
again reflecting the protracted recession which followed the Asian crisis; conversely, it 
reaches double-digit figures in Poland, possibly due to real convergence after the output 
collapse which characterised the early years of transition from planned to market economy. 
Production is least volatile in India, with a standard deviation of about 2.5 percentage 
points, and most volatile in Singapore, with a standard deviation of about 12 percentage 
points. It is also more volatile than inflation. As could be expected, the yield curve is up-
ward-sloping, with a median positive term premium of around 110 basis points across the 
sample. Two exceptions include Hungary and Poland, where the slope of the yield curve 
was inverted on average, reflecting the protracted tightening of monetary policy to counter 
inflationary pressures which both countries experienced over a large part of the sample, 
and resulting expectations of lower inflation and policy rates going forward.10 The (occa-
sionally large) standard deviations underscore the significant movements in the slope of the 
yield curve observed in many countries over the sample period. 
                                                                                                                                                    
obliged me to discard the earlier part of the sample. Clearly, this is highly unlikely to bias my results, as the 3-
month Treasury bill rate is a very close substitute for it (with a correlation coefficient of 0.98 post-1999). 
10 I owe this point to participants of a BIS working group on local currency bond market in emerging economies.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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nterest is the flattening – or even inversion – of the slope of the yield curve in many 
countri
h the literature (see e.g. Estrella, 2005b, who empha-
ises that it is “the level of the term spread, not the change, not even the source of change”, 
hich has best forecasting content). 
 
 
                                                
Figure 1 plots the evolution of the slope of the yield curve in the 14 emerging 
economies over time, which is shown here for the first time in a comparative way. Of par-
ticular i
es since 2004, which seems to echo that observed in the US and euro area in early 
2006.  
I test for unit roots and double unit roots in the logarithms of both prices and pro-
duction, using standard augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) and Dickey-Pantula (1987) tests. 
It goes without saying that the purpose here is not to determine whether prices and produc-
tion series are I(1) or I(2) decisively, an issue far beyond the scope of this paper. This is all 
the more the case since the time span of the data sample would be too short. Rather, I at-
tempt to gauge which order of differencing is most suitable to provide a satisfactory proxy 
for the underlying data generating process. All the tests include dummies for seasonal ef-
fects and outliers (e.g. due to crisis), as well as a time trend to capture the disinflation or 
convergence processes which are typical of many emerging economies over the sample 
period. The lag length of the test is chosen to ensure that the residuals are not autocorre-
lated, as indicated by the p-value of the Ljung-Box’s Q-statistic at various orders.11 Tables 
3a to 3d report the results. Almost all prices series are found to be I(1), with the exception 
of those of Hungary, which is found to be trend stationary, and of the Czech Republic, 
which is found to be I(2). Likewise, almost all industrial production series are found to be 
I(1), with the exception of that of Hong Kong, which is found to be I(2).12 I treat the slope 




11 It is this (country-specific) lag length which is retained in the subsequent estimations (Stock and Watson, 2003, 
use a fixed – i.e. country non-specific – lag length of 4). I also keep the seasonal dummies and the dummies to 
control for outliers and crises (the dummy equals 1 in November 2000 for Philippines; from September 1998 to 
December 1998 for Mexico; May 1998 to June 1998 for Malaysia; January 1998 to April 1998 for Korea; and 0 
otherwise). 
12 I also found statistical evidence that inflation in Korea and Taiwan might be trend stationary, albeit at the 10% 
level of confidence only and that industrial production growth in Malaysia might be trend stationary, albeit at the 
10% level of confidence only. Arnaud Mehl     
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4  Results  
 
4.1  Predictive role of the yield curve in emerging economies 
 
(i) In-sample measures of predictive content 
Table 4 gives a summary of results with the slope of the yield curve in emerging econo-
mies used as a predictor of domestic inflation and industrial production growth. The esti-
mation is computationally intensive, involving some 16,000 regressions.13 All the estimates 
reported are significant at the 5% level of confidence, unless otherwise indicated. The re-
sults are reported country by country14, including the forecast horizon h (which ranges 
from 6 months to 2 years, with 6-month intervals), the slope of the yield curve’s longest 
significant lag k (which is allowed to vary from 0 to T = 24 months) and  1 β , the response 
of inflation or growth in annual percentage rates over the forecast horizon to a 100 b.p. 
steepening in the slope of the yield curve. For example, according to the results reported 
for the US (pro memoria), a 100 basis point steepening of the slope of the domestic yield 
curve observed 2 years ago is associated with an expected acceleration in inflation by 
around 40 basis points p.a. over the next 6 months. 
Overall, the slope of the yield curve in emerging economies is found to have infor-
mation content for future inflation in almost all the countries.15 The information content is 
significant for both short (6 months) and long horizons (2 years). Long lags of the slope of 
the yield curve – on the order of two years, in some instances – are often found to still have 
significant predictive power. This suggests that information embodied in the slope of the 
yield curve, even in the relatively distant past, has relevant content for the future. More-
over, the response of inflation is often positive, in line with expectations (i.e. a steepening 
of the yield curve is associated with higher expected inflation). This is not always the case, 
however, as suggested by the results for Brazil, the Czech Republic, Malaysia, Mexico and 
the Philippines. This may have to do with inflation volatility, which is highest across the 
                                                 
13 In other words, a regression for 14 countries × 24 (k ) lags × 24 (h) months, for both inflation and industrial 
production growth, given the chosen parameterisation (as explained below).  
14 Clearly, an alternative would be to pool the data and use a panel estimator. However, this (i) would make the 
results not comparable with the previous literature, for which country-by-country estimates is the standard; (ii) is 
not needed, as the number of observations available per country (around 80 to 120) is already sufficient for effi-
cient estimation and (iii) would likely lead to biased estimates towards emerging Asian coefficients (as emerging 
Asian economies account for half of the countries in the sample). 
15 Taiwan is an exception, as predictive content for forecast horizons above a year and half is found not to be 
significant. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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sample for some of these countries, variations in risk premia, permanent and positive pro-
ductivity shocks, or a lack of liquidity in the domestic debt market, which distorts the in-
formation signals embodied in security prices. In terms of magnitude, averaging the results 
across the sample suggests that, beyond a 100 basis point steepening in the slope of the 
yield curve observed a year and a half ago, inflation is expected to accelerate by around 30 
basis points a year ahead (which is close to my estimate for the US). 
Likewise, the slope of the yield curve in emerging economies is found to contain 
information for future industrial production growth in almost all countries.16 Again, the in-
formation content is significant for both short and long forecast horizons, with long lags of 
the slope of the yield curve still having significant predictive ability. This confirms that 
information embodied in the slope of the yield curve, even in the relatively distant past, is 
relevant for the future. Moreover, the response of industrial production growth is often 
positive, in line with expectations (i.e. a steepening of the yield curve is associated with 
higher expected growth). This is not always the case, however, as suggested by results for 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Korea and Singapore, due to industrial production 
growth volatility, which is highest across the sample for some of these countries (baring 
India), variations in risk premia, permanent and positive productivity shocks, or lack of 
liquidity in the domestic debt market, which distorts information signals embodied in secu-
rity prices. Moreover, in some instances, estimated coefficients are unstable, switching 
signs across forecast horizons (e.g. Czech Republic, Mexico and South Africa). In terms of 
magnitude, averaging the results across the sample suggests that, beyond a 100 basis point 
steepening in the slope of the yield curve observed a year and half ago, industrial produc-
tion growth is expected to accelerate by around 30 basis points a year ahead. 
 
(ii) Pseudo out-of-sample measures of predictive content 
Table 5 reports MSFE based on equation (1), with results for inflation contained in the first 
column and those for growth in the fourth column. Models are estimated up to December 
2003 and used for out-of-sample forecasting from January 2004 to December 2005 at vari-
                                                 
16 Malaysia is an exception, as predictive content for forecast horizons below two years is found not to be signifi-
cant. Predictive content for some forecast horizons is also found not to be significant for India, Philippines and 
Taiwan. Saudi Arabia had to be dropped from the sample as it has time series for oil production only, not for 
total industrial production. Arnaud Mehl     
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ous horizons (6 months, 1 year, 18 months).17 The order p of the autoregressive process is 
set equal to that used for the unit and double unit root tests, to ensure absence of autocorre-
lation of the residuals. The (one-sided) p-value of the DM statistic, which tests whether the 
reported MSFE is significantly below unity, is reported for the 6-month horizon. For each 
emerging economy, I used the longest significant lag of the slope of the domestic yield 
curve, as found in in-sample estimation. The results suggest that for half of the countries in 
the sample (including Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Poland), adding the slope of the yield curve to a simple AR process improves the out-of-
sample forecasting performance for inflation at all horizons. Given how demanding the 
DM test is in a small sample, it is noteworthy that this improvement is even statistically 
significant at the 6-month horizon for a number of economies. This confirms that, for these 
economies, the slope of the domestic yield curve embodies genuine information for fore-
casting future inflation in real time. Conversely, in Mexico, where inflation has been high 
and volatile over part of the sample, adding the slope of the yield curve to a simple AR 
process never improves the out-of-sample forecasting performance. This confirms that, for 
this economy, the slope of the domestic yield curve has no genuine predictive power for 
future inflation. For the remaining economies, the slope of the domestic yield curve has 
genuine predictive power for future inflation at certain horizons. Likewise, the results sug-
gest that for a quarter of the countries in the sample (Hong Kong, India and Mexico), add-
ing the slope of the yield curve to a simple AR process improves the out-of-sample fore-
casting performance for industrial production growth at all horizons. This confirms that, 
for these economies, the slope of the domestic yield curve contains genuine information for 
forecasting future growth in real time. Conversely, for Singapore, adding the slope of the 
yield curve to a simple AR process never improves out-of-sample forecasting performance, 
while for the remaining economies the slope of the domestic yield curve has genuine pre-







17 As data for Brazil were available for a short time period (since 2000 only), constraining the number of degrees 
of freedom, out-of-sample forecasting could be performed at the 6-month horizon only. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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4.2  International financial linkages 
 
(i) Predictive role of US or euro area yield curve  
Table 6 reports the results when the slope of the yield curve in the US or euro area is used 
to predict inflation in emerging economies.18 For example, according to the first result re-
ported for the Czech Republic, beyond a 100 basis point steepening in the slope of the euro 
area yield curve observed a year and half ago, inflation is expected to accelerate at an an-
nualised rate of around 1.3 percentage points over the next 6 months. Overall, regarding 
specification (2), it is noteworthy that the slope of the US yield curve is found to contain 
information for future inflation in a wide array of emerging Asian economies, including 
Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia (at long forecast horizons), the Philippines and Taiwan, as 
well as in Saudi Arabia and South Africa. Moreover, the slope of the euro area yield curve 
is found to contain information for future inflation in the new EU Member States, includ-
ing the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Conversely, the slope of the US yield curve 
contains no significant information for future inflation in Brazil, India, Mexico and Singa-
pore. Turning to industrial production growth, the slope of the US yield curve is found to 
contain information for almost all economies, while that of the euro area is found to have 
information for Hungary. Moreover, the estimated coefficients are always positive, in line 
with expectations, and more stable than for inflation (they never change sign across fore-
cast horizons, in particular). In terms of magnitude, averaging the statistically significant 
results across the sample suggests that beyond a 100 basis point steepening in the slope of 
the foreign yield curve observed a year and a half ago, inflation is expected to accelerate 
by around 60 basis points a year ahead (at annual rates), while industrial production is ex-
pected to accelerate by around 200 basis points. 
Table 5 also reports the MSFE based on equation (2), with results for inflation in 
the second column and those for growth in the fifth column. For inflation, the results sug-
gest that for a third of the countries in the sample Czech Republic, Poland, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa and Taiwan), adding the slope of the yield curve of the US or euro area to a 
simple AR process improves the out-of-sample forecasting performance at all horizons. It 
is noteworthy that this improvement is statistically significant at the 6-month horizon for a 
number of economies, although the DM test is demanding in short samples. This suggests Arnaud Mehl     
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that, for these economies, the US or euro area slope of the yield curve has genuine predic-
tive power for future inflation. In the same vein, the results suggest that for almost half of 
the countries in the sample (Czech Republic, Hong Kong, India, the Philippines, Singapore 
and South Africa), adding the slope of the yield curve of the US or euro area to a simple 
AR process improves the out-of-sample forecasting performance for industrial growth at 
all horizons. This suggests that, for these economies, the US or euro area slope of the yield 
curve has genuine predictive power for future growth. 
The third and sixth columns of Table 5 give the MSFE, comparing out-of-sample 
forecasts based on equation (1) relative to those based on equation (2), to assess whether 
the US or euro area slope of the yield curve is a better predictor of inflation and growth in 
emerging economies than their own domestic slope. As for inflation, this is the case for six 
economies (Hong-Kong, Malaysia, and Philippines at the 18-month horizon; Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa at the 6-month horizon; and Taiwan), against nine for growth (Brazil, Czech 
Republic, Hong-Kong, India, Philippines, Poland, Singapore, South Africa and Tai-
wan).Several of these economies tightly peg (or tightly manage) their currency to the US 
dollar, which makes their monetary policy – and thereby slope of the yield curve as well as 
inflation and growth trends – follow closely that of the US. 
 
(ii) Yield curve spillovers 
To assess whether part of the information on future inflation and growth contained in the 
slope of the yield curve in emerging economies stems from the slope of the US or euro 
area yield curve in the first place, I instrument the former with the latter. The fitted series 
captures the movements in emerging economy yield curves which can be explained by 
movements in the US or euro area yield curve or by common shocks. The quality of the 
intrumentation is gauged with the statistical significance of the estimated parameter of the 
first stage regression, its R
2 and Granger causality tests. When the latter is found as a rea-
sonably good instrument, the fitted series is used in a second stage regression, as specified 
in equation (3).  
Table 7a reports the results of the first stage regression. The estimated coefficients 
are statistically significant for most countries, with the exception of India, Korea, Singa-
pore and South Africa (and Hungary, except when the euro area yield curve is used as in-
strument), which I then exclude from subsequent estimations. This may suggest that these 
                                                                                                                                                    
18 To give an idea of the intensiveness of the computations involved, this adds another 16,000 regressions to the 
previous estimations. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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economies, having deep or closed domestic financial markets, are somewhat insulated 
from US developments.19 Moreover, the coefficient is mostly positive and often close to 1, 
suggesting that the yield curve in emerging economies reacts in tandem with movements in 
the yield curve in the US or euro area. Exceptions include Hungary and Malaysia, where 
the correlation is significantly negative. The slope of the US yield curve explains a large 
share of the variance of the slope of the yield curve in Hong Kong, Mexico, Poland, Saudi 
Arabia and Taiwan, all of which have an exchange rate regime oriented towards the US 
dollar – over part of the sample period, at least – and have the US as an important trading 
partner. Granger causality test results, reported in Table 7b, further suggest that causality 
runs from the US yield curve to the yield curve in Hong Kong, Poland, Saudi Arabia and 
Taiwan, and detects significant feedback at some lags for both Brazil and Saudi Arabia. 
Table 8 reports the results when the instrumented emerging economy yield curve is 
used as a predictor for domestic inflation and growth. For example, according to the first 
result reported for Saudi Arabia, beyond a 100 basis point steepening in the domestic yield 
curve driven by movements in the US yield curve, and observed a half year ago, inflation 
is expected to accelerate by about half a percentage point p.a. in the next 6 months. Over-
all, using specification (3), this is also the case for Hong Kong, Poland and Taiwan, which 
together account for a quarter of the economies in the sample. The instrumented slope of 
the yield curve is also found to contain information for future inflation in other economies, 
including Brazil, Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico and Philippines, although the direction 
of causality remains open here, as mentioned above. Likewise, the instrumented slope of 
the yield curve is found to have information for future industrial production growth in 
these economies, with the same caveats. The negative response of inflation and growth for 
Hungary and Malaysia mirrors the negative sign of the estimated coefficient in the first 
stage regression. In terms of magnitude, averaging the statistically significant results over 
the sample suggest that, beyond a 100 basis points steepening in the slope of the domestic 
yield curve driven by movements in the US or euro area yield curve observed a year ago, 
inflation is expected to accelerate by around 60 basis points, while industrial production 
growth is expected to accelerate by 1.5 percentage points. 
Lastly, I test whether movements in emerging market yield curves that are purely 
country-specific contain useful information for future information and growth beyond that 
 
19 For some of these countries, the ability of the US yield curve to predict inflation or growth likely stems from 
the greater liquidity of US debt security markets, and thereby more efficient information processing in forecasting Arnaud Mehl     
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already contained in foreign-driven movements. To this end, I add the residual of the first-
stage regression (which can be interpreted as a country-specific component) to the specifi-
cation, as in equation (4). The results are reported in Table 9. The magnitude and signifi-
cance of the response of inflation or growth to movements of the emerging market yield 
curve driven by the US or euro area curve ( 1 β ) remain very similar to the results from the 
previous specification (although it did not control for movements of the emerging market 
yield curve that are purely country-specific). The movements in the emerging market yield 
curve that are purely country-specific have no residual forecasting power for future infla-
tion ( 0 2 = β ) for close to half of the countries in the sample; for the remaining half, some 
residual forecasting power remains ( 0 2 ≠ β ). As for future growth, movements in the 
emerging market yield curve that are purely country-specific tend to have no residual fore-
casting power for two-thirds of the countries in the sample while, for the remaining third, 
some residual information content remains. 
 
 
5  Robustness checks and interpretation 
 
5.1   Robustness checks 
 
I first check the robustness of the in-sample results by using an alternative specification of 
the persistence term, since the earlier literature placed particular emphasis on the marginal 
significance of predictive power. 
To this end, I replace ∑ = −
p
i i t iY
0α  with lagged terms of the h-step ahead forecast itself, i.e. 














is the steady-state response of   to  , i.e. the long-run acceleration in inflation or 
growth predicted by the slope of the yield curve k months ago (in annual percentage rates), 
and 
h
h t Y + k t X −
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is a necessary and sufficient condition for all the characteristic roots of the autoregressive 
part of the process to lie inside the unit circle. Results are similar for this specification, in 
terms of both sign and significance.20 The magnitude of the responses of inflation and 
growth tends to be slightly larger, however, given that they are steady-state (long-run) es-
timates. Reflecting this, averaging the results across the sample suggests that, beyond a 100 
basis point steepening in the slope of the emerging market yield curve, inflation is ex-
pected to accelerate by around 50 basis points and growth by 70 basis points. Likewise, 
beyond a 100 basis point steepening in the slope of the foreign yield curve, domestic infla-
tion is expected to accelerate by around 70 basis points and growth by 3 percentage points. 
Lastly, beyond a 100 basis point steepening in the slope of the emerging yield curve driven 
by movements in the foreign yield curve, inflation is expected to accelerate by around 1.3 
percentage points and growth by 2.7 percentage points. 
Turning to the out-of-sample results, I calculate the modified Diebold-Mariano test 
statistic (as in Harvey et al. 1997), which has better properties than the standard one for 
samples of moderate size, such as mine. The results remain largely unaltered.21 In addition, 
I use a longer out-of-sample period (3 years versus the previous 2 years) for the countries 
with data from the mid-1990s (Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore and South Africa). The results are reported in Table 10. By and large, 
and bearing in mind the possible loss of consistency due to the smaller in-sample estima-
tion period, the results are qualitatively similar. MSFEs often remain close in magnitude to 
those previously obtained. An exception is Singapore, where the ability of the US yield 
curve to beat an AR process or the local yield curve at forecasting growth deteriorates 
sharply. In terms of statistical significance (measured by the DM statistic), the results are 
more mixed. The forecasting power of the local yield curve gains in significance for the 
Philippines and South Africa (inflation), but loses in significance for Hong Kong, Malaysia 
(inflation) and Mexico (growth). Moreover, the forecasting power of the US yield curve 
gains in significance for Saudi Arabia (inflation) and South Africa (growth), but loses in 
significance for Singapore (growth) and South Africa (inflation). 
                                                 
20 They are not reported here in detail to save space but are available upon request. 
21 The modified DM-statistic is equal to the standard one times a scaling factor; it follows a t-distribution with n-1 
degrees of freedom. Results are not reported here to save space but are available upon request. Arnaud Mehl     
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As a recent paper by Ang et al. (2006) finds evidence in the US that the short term 
rate predicts growth better than the yield curve, I test whether this is also the case in 
emerging economies. Table 11 reports the MSFE comparing out-of-sample forecasts of 
growth at the 6-month horizon based on equation (1) relative to those based on a similar 
equation where I replace the emerging market yield curve with the 3-month treasury bill 
rate. The results are mixed. The short term rate is found to be a better predictor indeed than 
the yield curve in Hong-Kong, Hungary, India and Singapore (as the MSFE above unity 
suggests). This mirrors the evidence for the US in Ang et al. (2006). By contrast, the yield 
curve remains a better predictor for Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Poland and South Af-
rica (as suggested by the MSFE criterion, which is significantly below unity). This con-
firms that, at least for some emerging market countries, the yield curve is a relevant lead-
ing indicator for growth. 
To end with international spillovers, I test as a final robustness check whether coun-
try spreads, that is the premia paid by emerging economies to borrow in international capi-
tal markets, also help forecast macroeconomic variables in these economies.22 To this end, 
I replace the slope of the yield curve in equation (1) by the spread, relative to US treasur-
ies, of international bonds of a similar maturity issued by emerging sovereigns, as available 
from JP Morgan’s EMBIG indices, a standard market benchmark. I have data for seven 
countries from January 1998 onwards. Table 12 reports in-sample estimations at the 6-
month and 12-month horizon. The key result is that country spreads indeed contain infor-
mation for both future inflation and growth. This underscores their direct impact on future 
economic conditions and their role as catalyst of US interest rate shocks. In terms of sign, 
spreads are found to widen ahead of an acceleration in inflation (except for Hungary and 
Malaysia), which may reflect market expectations of tighter monetary policy going for-
ward. The evidence for growth is mixed, with wider spreads signalling higher growth in 
Brazil, Malaysia and the Philippines, but lower growth in the remaining countries. The lat-
ter result perhaps mirrors the adverse impact of higher borrowing costs on future economic 
activity, as noted in Uribe and Yue (2006). 
 
 
22 Uribe and Yue (2006) find indeed that country spreads drive their business cycles and play a role in propagat-
ing US interest rate shocks. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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5.2   Interpretation 
 
To measure synthetically the quality of the emerging market yield curve as a predictor of 







jh h j i i
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for emerging market i; j = inflation, growth; and horizon h = 6 months, 12 months, 18 
months. The index  i Θ  can take values between 0 (relative to an AR process, the emerging 
market slope of the yield curve never adds information content at any horizon in out-of-
sample forecasting of both inflation and growth) and 6 (the emerging market yield curve 
adds information content at all horizons in out-of-sample forecasting of both inflation and 
growth). Likewise, to measure synthetically whether the US or euro area yield curve is a 
“better” predictor of both inflation and growth in emerging economies than their own do-
mestic yield curves, I define a similar index using the MSFE that compares out-of-sample 
forecasts based on equation (1) to those based on equation (2), denoted  . 
*
i Θ
As can be seen from Figure 2, which plots the values of  i Θ  by country, the yield 
curve of India adds information content at all horizons in out-of-sample forecasting of do-
mestic inflation and growth, which is never the case for Brazil and Taiwan. The remaining 
countries are intermediate cases. There are signs that differences across emerging econo-
mies in terms of forecasting ability of the domestic slope of the yield curve are linked to 
market liquidity. As can be seen from regression results reported in Table 13 indeed,  i Θ  is 
positively correlated with the share of long-term domestic debt securities in GDP, although 
not significantly, which may be due to the very small size of my sample (14 country obser-
vations).23 Likewise, as can be seen from Figure 3, which plots the values of   by coun-
try, the US or euro area yield curve is always a better predictor of inflation and growth in 
Hong Kong than its own domestic curve, which is never the case for e.g. Korea, while the 
remaining countries are intermediate cases. There is evidence that differences across 
emerging economies in terms of forecasting ability of the foreign yield curve are linked to 




i ΘArnaud Mehl     
 
The yield curve as a predictor and emerging economies 
 
  32
                                                                                                                                                   
facto index of exchange rate flexibility, notwithstanding the small size of the sample.24 
Moreover, the less liquid domestic debt markets are relative to US debt markets, the better 
the slope of the US or euro area yield curve is as predictor, although this negative correla-
tion is not significant. Conversely, the role of common shocks, proxied by the average of 
correlations between (i) domestic and US inflation and (ii) domestic and US industrial pro-
duction growth, is less certain, as it is neither robust nor significant. All in all, this suggests 
that international yield curve spillovers are channelled mainly through the short end of the 
maturity spectrum and policy interest rate pass-through. This echoes recent evidence from 
Frankel et al. (2004), Shambaugh (2004) and Obstfeld et al. (2005), suggesting that pegs 
follow base country interest rates more than non-pegs. 
 
 
6  Conclusions 
 
The role of the yield curve as a predictor has been challenged forcefully of late, particu-
larly in the US context. This paper has found some evidence that the yield curve, including 
the US one, may still be useful for forecasting purposes and, perhaps more importantly, to 
understand the ongoing process of international financial integration. 
A sample of 14 emerging economies was used to investigate the usefulness of the 
slope of the domestic yield curve in forecasting inflation and growth over the last decade, 
following the standard methodology surveyed in Stock and Watson (2003). It has found 
that the yield curve contains information in almost all countries, even after controlling for 
inflation and growth persistence, at both short and long forecast horizons. On average, in-
sample results suggest that, beyond a 100 basis point steepening observed a year and a half 
ago, both inflation and growth are expected to accelerate by around 30 basis points a year 
ahead. Moreover, for around half of the countries in the sample, adding the yield curve to a 
simple autoregressive process improves out-of-sample forecasting performance for infla-
tion at all horizons. This confirms that, for these economies, the yield curve embodies 
genuine information for forecasting future inflation in real time. Likewise, for a quarter of 
 
23 It is worth noting that the overall share of domestic debt securities in GDP is not a good proxy for liquidity, as 
it includes – in economies which had high and volatile inflation – instruments that are linked to a foreign cur-
rency or indexed to prices. 
24 The index is constructed from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)’s de facto classification of exchange rate regimes. 
Each country is split each year into 3 categories, i.e. peg, intermediate and float, with weights of 0, 1 and 2, re-
spectively. I take the weighted average over the sample period as a proxy of the de facto regime of the corre-
sponding country. The proxy is therefore continuously increasing with exchange rate flexibility.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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the countries in the sample, the slope of the yield curve improves out-of-sample forecasting 
performance for industrial production growth at all horizons. It is noteworthy to observe 
that this improvement is statistically significant at the 6-month horizon for a number of 
economies, although the tests are very demanding for small samples. Moreover, there are 
signs – albeit still tentative – that differences across emerging economies in terms of fore-
casting ability of the slope of the domestic yield curve are linked to market liquidity. 
In examining international financial linkages, my core focus, the paper assessed the 
ability of the slope of the US or euro area yield curve to help predict inflation and growth 
in these emerging economies. It has found that the US yield curve contains information for 
future inflation in half of the countries in the sample, while the slope of the euro area yield 
curve has information for future inflation in the new EU Member States. Likewise, the US 
yield curve is found to contain information content for growth in almost all economies. On 
average, in-sample results suggest that, beyond a 100 basis point steepening observed a 
year and a half ago, inflation is expected to accelerate by around 60 basis points a year 
ahead, against 2 percentage points for industrial production growth. Moreover, for around 
a third of the countries in the sample, adding the US or the euro area yield curve to a sim-
ple autoregressive process improves out-of-sample forecasting performance for inflation at 
all horizons. This confirms that, for these economies, the US or euro area yield curve em-
bodies genuine information for forecasting future inflation in real time. Similarly, for al-
most half of the countries in the sample, the US curve improves out-of-sample forecasting 
performance for industrial production growth at all horizons. Again, the improvement is 
statistically significant at the 6-month horizon for a number of economies, although the 
tests are very demanding for small samples. 
The paper also found that the slope of the US or euro area yield curve is a “better” 
predictor than emerging economies’ own domestic slopes for around half of the countries 
in the sample for inflation, against two-thirds for growth. There is evidence that differences 
across countries are linked to the exchange rate regime, controlling for relative market li-
quidity and commonalities in economic shocks. Indeed, the more an emerging economy 
pegs to the US dollar or euro, the greater the superiority of the US or euro area yield curve 
in terms predictive power. This suggests that international yield curve spillovers are chan-
nelled mainly through the short end of the maturity spectrum and policy interest rate pass-
through.  Arnaud Mehl     
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In line with this, in investigating the possible spillovers between yield curves, I 
have found that part of the information content of the slope of the Hong Kong, Polish, 
Saudi and Taiwanese yield curves stems, in a causal sense, from the US yield curve in the 
first place. All these countries had a – more or less stringent – peg to the US dollar, at least 
over part of the sample period. This confirms that US monetary policy changes spill over 
to the rest of the world and are a key driver of international financial linkages. Moreover, 
movements in the emerging market yield curves that are purely country-specific are often 
found not to have residual information content, in particular for future growth. In essence, 
these results, which are resilient to a number of robustness checks, are in line with, and ex-
tend those of, Chinn and Frankel (2005) who – focusing on interest rate levels and the in-
dustrialised world – found that US interest rates drive interest rates elsewhere, at least at 
the short end of the maturity spectrum. 
Looking ahead, more work may be needed to understand cross-country differences 
in terms of ability of domestic yield curves to predict inflation and growth, an area which 
has remained under-researched, including for industrial countries. I have tried to provide 
some interpretation for my results, but it relies on a small sample, and should therefore be 
considered tentative. Moreover, investigating possible forecasting improvements via ad-
justments in yield curve movements for variations in risk premia, in line with very recent 
findings in the literature on the US or euro area, may be worthwhile. Given that this in-
volves markedly different methods, including estimation of affine arbitrage-free term 
structure models, I will take this up in future research. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Long-term interest rate Short-term interest rate
(Start) (End)
Euro area (Germany) 5-year government bond yield 3-month treasury bill yield  January 1995 December 2005
United States 5-year government bond yield 3-month treasury bill yield  January 1995 December 2005
Brazil 3-year government bond yield 3-month treasury bill yield  April 2000 August 2005
Czech Republic 5-year government note yield  3-month treasury bill yield  March 1997 August 2005
Hong Kong 5-year government note yield  3-month treasury bill yield  January 1995 December 2005
Hungary 5-year government note yield  3-month treasury bill yield  February 1997 December 2005
India 5-year government bond yield 3-month treasury bill yield  January 1995 December 2005
Korea 5-year government bond yield 3-month time deposit rate January 1998 December 2005
Malaysia 5-year government note yield  3-month treasury bill discount rate January 1995 December 2005
Mexico 3-year government bond yield 3-month CETES yield January 1995 December 2005
Philippines 5-year government bond auction rate 3-month treasury bill yield  January 1996 December 2005
Poland 5-year government bond yield 3-month treasury bill yield  March 1999 August 2005
Saudia Arabia 5-year government note yield  3-month treasury bill yield  March 1995 August 2005
Singapore 5-year government bond yield 3-month treasury bill yield  January 1995 December 2005
South Africa 5-year government note yield  3-month treasury bill yield  January 1995 December 2005
Taiwan 10-year government bond yield  1-month treasury bill yield  January 1998 December 2005
Source: Global Financial Data, with the exception of Brazil, the euro area, the United States and Poland (Bloomberg).
Sample 
Table 1: Description of the data used to proxy the slope of the yield curve in emerging economies






Brazil 7.77 3.91 2.45 5.10 205 384
Czech Republic 4.12 3.33 3.83 5.47 62 142
Hong Kong 0.01 3.77 -4.10 5.13 171 90
Hungary 9.94 5.57 7.58 6.21 -183 132
India 5.56 3.28 5.97 2.55 94 86
Korea 2.78 1.11 7.24 8.82 102 110
Malaysia 2.41 1.28 6.32 8.31 105 83
Mexico 11.15 8.30 3.70 4.92 176 380
Philippines 5.96 2.34 -0.81 6.25 391 248
Poland 6.18 4.52 10.37 7.59 -110 177
Saudia Arabia -0.11 0.93 128 107
Singapore 0.77 0.97 5.76 12.27 151 71
South Africa 5.70 2.83 1.29 3.78 75 159
Taiwan 1.04 1.38 4.75 7.57 123 72
All countries
Median 4.84 4.75 114
Average 4.52 4.18 106
Source: author's calculations.
Table 2: Descriptive statisitics for the data
(y-o-y, %) (y-o-y, %)
Slope of the yield curve 
(basis points)
Inflation                 Industrial production
 Unit root and double unit root tests 
 
Unit root test specification: 
∑ = − − + + + Δ + + = Δ
p
i t i t i t t t y y y
1 1 effects   seasonal   and   outliers for    dummies ε λ γ β α  
β p Q(1) Q(6) Q(12)
Brazil -2.26 3 0.59 0.59 0.79
Czech Republic -2.02 8 0.86 0.92 0.92
Hong Kong -2.95 3 0.96 0.30 0.22
Hungary -4.13 *** 6 0.70 0.83 0.97
India -1.48 40 . 7 20 . 8 10 .
Korea -3.16 * 4 0.93 0.75 0.38
Malaysia -2.08 7 0.99 0.99 0.67
Mexico -2.71 11 0.25 0.56 0.72
Philippines -2.37 40 . 6 50 . 3 60 .
Poland -2.37 20 . 9 70 . 2 60 .
Saudia Arabia -0.65 5 0.66 0.93 0.43
Singapore -2.56 50 . 7 30 . 9 90 .
South Africa -2.06 5 0.90 0.95 0.40







k)  is the p-value of the Ljung-Box statistics for absence of autocorrelation up to order k.
        (***), (**), (*): statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence.
Table 3a: Test results for a unit root in prices
 
 
β p Q(1) Q(6) Q(12)
Brazil -1.60 8 0.88 0.99 0.99
Czech Republic -1.25 8 0.98 0.99 0.82
Hong Kong -2.19 12 0.98 0.99 0.97
Hungary -1.70 6 0.64 0.95 0.38
India -2.47 40 . 9 00 . 9 80 .
Korea -3.18 40 . 7 10 . 7 80 .
Malaysia -3.39 * 10 0.96 0.99 0.95
Mexico -2.51 50 . 6 20 . 7 90 .
Philippines -2.26 20 . 9 50 . 8 60 .
Poland -2.67 30 . 8 60 . 9 60 .
Saudia Arabia
Singapore -1.78 11 0.45 0.98 0.23
South Africa -1.47 2 0.43 0.98 0.61








k)  is the p-value of the Ljung-Box statistics for absence of autocorrelation up to order k.
        (***), (**), (*): statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence.




Double unit root test specification: 
 
 
∑ = − − + + + Δ + Δ + = Δ
p




2 effects   seasonal   and   outliers for    dummies ε λ γ β α
β p Q(1) Q(6) Q(12)
Brazil -3.80 ** 3 0.85 0.87 0.93
Czech Republic -2.60 8 0.83 0.96 0.98
Hong Kong -3.60 ** 3 0.60 0.66 0.35
Hungary
India -5.69 *** 4 0.78 0.97 0.28
Korea
Malaysia -4.19 *** 7 0.97 0.99 0.67
Mexico -3.55 ** 11 0.56 0.98 0.97
Philippines -3.17 * 4 0.99 0.99 0.39
Poland -4.92 *** 2 0.91 0.35 0.66
Saudia Ar
Singapore -3.84 * * 50 . 9 70 . 9





abia -3.36 * 5 0.93 0.95 0.59
90 . 5 0
0.52
k)  is the p-value of the Ljung-Box statistics for absence of autocorrelation up to order k.
        (***), (**), (*): statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence.
Table 3c:  Test results for a double unit root in prices
β p Q(1) Q(6) Q(12)
Brazil -4.88 *** 8 0.99 0.99 0.99
Czech Republic -3.59 ** 8 0.96 0.98 0.75
Hong Kong -2.02 12 0.94 0.99 0.96
Hungary -3.25 * 5 0.76 0.96 0.43
India -5.06 *** 40 . 9 30 . 8 80 . 3 8
Korea -4.89 *** 40 . 9 30 . 9 80 . 6 6
Malaysia -3.16 * 10 0.85 0.99 0.97
Mexico -5.82 *** 50 . 9 00 . 9 70 . 3 9
Philippines -7.02 *** 20 . 7 30 . 8 30 . 9 0
Poland -5.34 *** 30 . 8 50 . 9 70 . 5 0
Saudia Arabia
Singapore -3.60 ** 11 0.48 0.96 0.97
South Africa -7.82 *** 20 . 9 00 . 9 80 . 6 1
Taiwan -4.01 ** 12 0.22 0.61 0.42
Source: author's estimates.




        (***), (**), (*): statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence.







US h = 6 months k = 24 0.37 24 2.17
1 year 24 0.46 24 2.02
1.5 years 24 0.44 21 1.87
2 years 24 0.30 20 1.60
Brazil h = 6 months k = 5 0.88 k = 24 0.85
1 year 24 -0.73 24 0.27
1.5 years 24 -0.72 22 0.27
2 years 24 -0.79 23 0.29
Czech Republic h = 6 months k = 19 -0.40 k = 24 -0.74
1 year 19 -0.50 18 -0.74
1.5 years 18 -0.46 24 0.60
2 years 17 -0.37 24 0.60
Hong Kong h = 6 months k = 17 0.93 k = 20 2.83
1 year 12 0.83 23 2.33
1.5 years 17 0.78 21 1.77
2  y e a r s 1 70 . 7 6 1 91 . 5 2
Hungary h = 6 months k = 20 0.46 k = 13 -2.36
1 year 22 0.44 12 -1.50
1.5 years 21 0.39 24 -1.95
2 years 19 0.23 24 -1.58
India h = 6 months k = 21 1.70 k = 19 -0.97
1 year 18 1.35 15 -0.62
1.5 years 16 0.94 8 -0.68
2 years 13 0.83
Korea h = 6 months k = 23 0.34 k = 23 -2.60
1 year 20 0.21 18 -2.19
1.5 years 15 0.15 15 -1.88
2 years 13 0.11 16 -1.27
Table 4: The slope of the yield curve in emerging economies as a predictor of their domestic inflation and 
growth
Not significant
Specification as in Eq. (1)
 Malaysia h = 6 months k = 23 -0.56 k =
1 year 17 -0.66
1.5 years 17 -0.50
2 years 23 -0.31 20 -0.77
Mexico h = 6 months k = 11 -0.18 k = 13 0.26
1 year 12 -0.13 11 0.16
1.5 years 11 -0.15 5 0.30
2 years 13 -0.10 23 -0.16
Philippines h = 6 months k = 8 -0.31 k = 12 . 1 7
1 year 8 -0.19 0 1.47
1.5 years 7 -0.27
2 years 5 -0.24 1 1.10
Poland h = 6 months k = 24 0.70 k = 13 1.83
1 year 24 0.54 18 2.90
1.5 years 24 0.35 13 2.74
2  y e a r s 2 30 . 1 3 1 30 . 9 7
Saudi Arabia h = 6 months k = 24 0.30
1 year 22 0.24
1.5 years 20 0.24
2 years 17 0.20
Singapore h = 6 months k = 14 0.62 k = 21 -10.59
1 year 12 0.57 22 -5.98
1.5 years 9 0.44 19 -3.87
2 years 5 0.32 24 -3.66
South Africa h = 6 months k = 40 . 6 6 k = 31 . 3 7
1 year 16 0.65 2 0.86
1.5 years 15 0.56 3 0.83
2 years 15 0.34 24 -0.68
Taiwan h = 6 months k = 50 . 7 2 k = 94 . 0 0
1 year 0 0.58 Not significant
1.5 years 24 4.47
2 years 24 4.01








 Table 5: Pseudo out-of-sample mean squared forecast errors
EME   
AR(p)
US   
AR(p)
US   
EME
EME   
AR(p)
US   
AR(p)
US   
EME
h =
Brazil 6 months 1.94 … … 18.71 1.04 0.06 ***
(DM's p-value ) (0.93) (1.00) (0.46) (0.00)
12 months
18 months
Czech Republic 6 months 0.65 0.74 1.14 1.08 0.87 ** 0.80 **
(DM's p-value ) (0.28) (n/a) (0.56) (0.48) (0.02) (0.05)
12 months 0.35 0.77 2.22 0.79 0.65 0.81
18 months 0.15 0.50 3.20 0.63 0.76 1.20
Hong Kong 6 months 0.87 *** … … 0.99 0.78 0.79
(DM's p-value ) (0.01) (0.55) (0.50) (0.50)
12 months 0.84 0.77 0.92 0.87 0.50 0.57
18 months 1.06 0.64 0.60 0.79 0.60 0.76
Hungary 6 months 0.57 *** 0.79 *** 1.38 … … …
(DM's p-value ) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00)
12 months 0.78 1.03 1.32 … … …
18 months 0.84 1.11 1.32 … … …
India 6 months 0.47 *** … … 0.81 *** 0.73 *** 0.90
(DM's p-value ) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.14)
12 months 0.36 … … 0.89 0.55 0.62
18 months 0.51 … … 0.78 0.46 0.59
Korea 6 months 0.70 ** 2.62 3.75 0.82 *** 3.27 4.00
(DM's p-value ) (0.05) (0.71) (0.78) (0.01) (0.93) (0.96)
12 months 0.87 2.03 2.34 0.99 2.10 2.13
18 months 0.54 2.95 5.47 1.04 2.12 2.05
Malaysia 6 months 0.96 * … … … 1.43 …
(DM's p-value ) (0.11) (0.85)
12 months 0.30 … … … 1.27 …
18 months 0.56 0.42 0.75 … 1.17 …
Growth forecasts Inflation forecasts
 Mexico 6 months 1.04 … … 0.77 1.50 1.95
(DM's p-value ) (0.45) (n/a) (0.91) (0.99)
12 months 1.06 … … 0.71 2.22 3.14
18 months 1.19 … … 0.70 2.54 3.61
Philippines 6 months 0.80 * 0.88 1.10 1.10 0.90 0.82 **
(DM's p-value ) (0.07) (0.20) (0.22) (0.50) (0.20) (0.05)
12 months 0.99 … … 1.32 0.45 0.34
18 months 0.91 0.31 0.35 … 0.19 …
Poland 6 months 0.24 *** 0.67 *** 2.77 2.96 … …
(DM's p-value ) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00) (0.98)
12 months 0.10 0.58 6.04 3.30 … 0.44
18 months 0.10 0.96 9.15 … 1.02 …
Saudi Arabia 6 months 1.04 0.76 ** 0.73 **
(DM's p-value ) (0.36) (0.01) (0.03)
12 months 0.61 0.30 0.49
18 months 0.55 0.43 0.78
Singapore 6 months 1.04 … … 1.11 0.68 *** 0.61
(DM's p-value ) (0.31) (0.44) (0.00) (0.15)
12 months 0.43 … … 1.00 0.71 0.71
18 months 2.22 … … 1.02 0.69 0.68
South Africa 6 months 1.20 0.65 *** 0.54 *** 0.88 ** 0.80 0.91
(DM's p-value ) (0.48) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.22) (0.33)
12 months 0.50 0.57 1.16 0.96 0.86 0.89
18 months 0.44 0.50 1.14 1.27 0.31 0.24
Taiwan 6 months 1.42 0.83 ** 0.58 *** 1.80 1.12 0.62 **
(DM's p-value ) (1.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.98) (0.89) (0.02)
12 months 1.27 0.69 0.55 … 0.83 …
18 months … 0.51 … 6.22 1.96 0.32
Source: author's estimates.
Notes: (…) indicates that the MSFE was not calculated due to insignificant in-sample predictor.
           The p-value of the statistic DM is that of a one-sided test.
           (n/a) indicates that the p-value could not be calculated due to a negative estimated asymptotic variance.
           (***), (**), (*): statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence.  
 Horizon
Longest 




Brazil h = 6 months k = k = 24 3.01
1 year 24 1.79
1.5 years 23 1.29
2 years 24 -0.88
Czech Republic* h = 6 months k = 18 1.28 k = 13 2.07
1 year 16 1.48 12 1.97
1.5 years 12 1.62 9 2.02
2 years 10 1.30 9 1.52
Hong Kong h = 6 months k = k = 24 3.98
1 year 00 . 9 9 2 43 . 7 4
1.5 years 00 . 9 8 2 42 . 5 2
2 years 10 . 8 4 2 31 . 5 1
Hungary* h = 6 months k = 81 . 3 0 k = 04 . 0 6
1 year 24 -1.13 0 3.80
1.5 years 22 -0.76 0 1.83
2 years 00 . 8 0 01 . 4 1
India h = 6 months k = k = 24 1.88
1 year 24 1.35
1.5 years 22 1.19
2 years 12 0.96
Korea h = 6 months k = 80 . 5 1 k = 22 4.45
1 year 12 0.31 18 3.51
1.5 years 90 . 2 1 1 51 . 7 5
2 years 10 0.11 Not significant
Table 6: The US (or euro area*) slope of the yield curve as a predictor of inflation and growth in emerging 
economies











Malaysia h = 6 months k = k = 21 2.85
1 year 18 1.81
1.5 years 24 0.44 17 1.69
2 years 17 0.34 16 0.99
Mexico h = 6 months k = k = 20 1.90
1 year 20 1.69
1.5 years 19 1.56
2 years 50 . 7 4 1 10 . 9 8
Philippines h = 6 months k = 11 0.82 k = 92 . 8 0
1 year 24 3.02
1.5 years 23 0.77 24 2.80
2 years 21 0.60 20 1.87
Poland* h = 6 months k = 21 1.91 k =
1 year 21 1.86
1.5 years 18 1.62 7 2.37
2 years 16 1.64 11 1.62
Saudi Arabia h = 6 months k = 70 . 4 5
1 year 60 . 3 7
1.5 years 30 . 3 8
2 years 00 . 3 7
Singapore h = 6 months k = k = 24 5.54
1 year 24 5.02
1.5 years 18 3.38
2 years 20 2.46
South Africa h = 6 months k = 24 -1.46 k = 24 3.48
1 year 24 -1.41 24 1.89
1.5 years 23 -1.03 23 1.42
2 years 19 -0.97 21 1.14
Taiwan h = 6 months k = 24 1.15 k = 20 3.02
1 year 24 0.75 12 3.23
1.5 years 24 0.68 13 3.00
2 years 23 0.47 14 2.63
Source: author's estimates. Results significant at least at the 5% level of confidence, unless otherwise indicated.





















2 of the 
regression
Brazil US 0.83 0.09 0.03
Czech Republic US 0.45 0.00 0.07
Czech Republic Euro area 0.88 0.00 0.12
Hong Kong US 0.89 0.00 0.64
Hungary US 0.13 0.37 0.00
Hungary Euro area -0.42 0.05 0.03
India US -0.14 0.14 0.01
Korea US 0.07 0.45 0.44
Malaysia US -0.15 0.09 0.11
Mexico US 0.86 0.00 0.75
Philippines US 0.71 0.00 0.09
Poland US 1.25 0.00 0.39
Poland Euro area 1.21 0.00 0.14
Saudi Arabia US 0.95 0.00 0.53
Singapore US 0.12 0.13 0.01
South Africa US -0.03 0.87 0.00
Taiwan US 0.49 0.00 0.37
Table 7a: First-stage regressions for the instrumentation
Lags 2 6 12 18 2 6 12 18
B r a z i l 0 . 7 80 . 2 90 . 7 30 . 0 5 * * 0 . 2 80 . 0 5 * * 0 . 0 8 * 0 . 0 8 *
C z e c h 0 . 1 20 . 6 20 . 8 80 . 9 5 0 . 7 90 . 7 60 . 9 60 . 9 1
Hong Kong 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.01 *** 0.02 *** 0.59 0.97 0.97 0.93
H u n g a r y 0 . 5 20 . 7 80 . 5 90 . 8 3 0 . 4 80 . 4 00 . 4 70 . 5 6
I n d i a 0 . 8 90 . 3 20 . 5 30 . 5 9 0 . 8 60 . 8 60 . 9 00 . 9 0
K o r e a 0 . 5 80 . 3 40 . 6 40 . 7 6 0 . 4 80 . 8 20 . 9 60 . 9 8
Malaysia 0.43 0.82 0.82 0.90 0.29 0.70 0.83 0.81
Mexico 0.95 0.82 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.99
P h i l i p p i n e s 0 . 2 90 . 6 20 . 8 20 . 8 1 0 . 4 40 . 3 90 . 6 20 . 1 3
Poland 0.03 ** 0.44 0.56 0.38 0.70 0.35 0.20 0.66
Saudi 0.10 * 0.16 0.17 0.27 0.02 ** 0.12 0.41 0.52
S i n g a p o r e 0 . 9 00 . 9 30 . 4 30 . 7 0 0 . 2 20 . 5 20 . 6 00 . 7 1
South Africa 0.65 0.87 0.90 0.45 0.46 0.66 0.87 0.86
Taiwan 0.00 *** 0.04 ** 0.03 ** 0.01 *** 0.61 0.48 0.25 0.56
Euro area 0.03 ** 0.09 * 0.28 0.38 0.09 * 0.35 0.73 0.35
Lags 2 6 12 18 2 6 12 18
Czech republic 0.51 0.68 0.68 0.19 0.95 0.30 0.73 0.47
H u n g a r y 0 . 9 10 . 6 20 . 1 70 . 1 0 0 . 1 50 . 1 80 . 6 40 . 2 6
Poland 0.50 0.60 0.10 * 0.30 0.39 0.04 ** 0.09 * 0.14
Source: author's estimates.
Note:  (***), (**), (*): statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence.
Table 7b: Granger causality tests between the slope of the yield curve in the US and the slope of the yield curve in emerging 
economies
H0: The US slope of the yield curve is not Granger causal
H0: The corresponding country's  slope of the yield curve is 
not Granger causal
H0: The euro area slope of the yield curve is not Granger 
causal














Brazil h = 6 months k = 24 -5.63 k = 24 4.77
1 year 24 -4.47 24 1.89
1.5 years 24 -3.03 24 0.65
2 years 24 -2.73 22 0.56
Czech Republic h = 6 months k = 18 1.35 k = 12 5.30
1 year 14 1.37 13 3.82
1.5 years 17 1.17 12 3.45
2 years 80 . 9 9 14 2.57
Hong Kong h = 6 months k = k = 24 4.50
1 year 0 1.12 24 4.22
1.5 years 0 1.11 24 2.85
2 years 1 0.95 23 1.71
Hungary h = 6 months k = 8 -2.44 k = 0 -8.55
1 year 8 -2.27 0 -9.03
1.5 years 4 -2.09 0 -4.35
2 years 3 -1.50 0 -3.35
Malaysia h = 6 months k = 20 1.14 k = 19 -10.81
1 year 19 -8.32
1.5 years 18 -3.98




Table 8: The instrumented emerging market slope of the yield curve as a predictor of inflation and growth 
in emerging economies
Specification as in Eq. (3)
 Mexico h = 6 months k = 11 -0.13 k = 14 0.17
1 year 12 -0.09 4 0.21
1.5 years 11 -0.14 3 0.17
2 years 11 -0.14 24 -0.23
Philippines h = 6 months k = 11 0.73 k = 93 . 4 4
1 year 23 0.89 24 2.74
1.5 years 23 0.80 18 1.39
2 years 19 0.59 13 1.11
Poland h = 6 months k = 22 1.05 k = 20 4.17
1 year 18 1.00 19 3.43
1.5 years 15 0.63 18 2.68
2 years 14 0.28 15 0.92
Saudi Arabia h = 6 months k = 70 . 4 5
1 year 60 . 3 8
1.5 years 30 . 4 0
2 years 00 . 4 0
Taiwan h = 6 months k = 24 2.62 k = 20 6.51
1 year 24 1.95 17 6.81
1.5 years 24 1.63 14 6.65
2 years 22 1.26 15 5.69
Source: author's estimates. Results significant at least at the 5% level of confidence, unless otherwise indicated.
 
  
Table 9: Predictive content of foreign-driven vs. country-specific yield curve movements
Origin of emerging market yield curve movements: Foreign Country-specific Foreign Country-specific
Horizon Lag β 1 β 2 Lag β 1 β 2
Brazil h = 6 months 21 -4.84 ** 0.07 24 4.35 *** 0.30
1 year 24 -3.48 *** -0.27 *** 22 2.64 *** 0.01
1.5 years 20 -2.15 *** -0.26 *** 20 1.91 *** -0.28
2 years 19 -1.83 *** -0.32 *** 18 0.56 *** 0.10 *
Czech Republic h = 6 months 20 1.15 ** -0.68 *** 12 5.17 *** -1.11 ***
1 year 14 1.03 *** -0.82 *** 13 3.46 *** -1.11 ***
1.5 years 10 0.65 *** -0.76 *** 14 2.75 ** -0.72 **
2 years 8 0.52 ** -0.72 *** 14 2.57 ** -0.37 **
Hong Kong  h = 6 months 0 0.89 ** -0.85 * 24 4.45 *** -0.44
1 year 0 1.10 ** -0.40 24 4.16 *** -0.77
1.5 years 0 1.08 ** -0.06 24 2.89 *** -0.70
2 years 1 0.97 ** 0.30 23 1.70 *** -0.07
Hungary h = 6 months 5 -3.14 ** -0.10 0 -9.36 ** -1.54
1 year 6 -1.97 ** 0.33 0 -10.14 *** -1.57
1.5 years 4 -2.11 ** 0.11 0 -5.01 *** -1.96
2 years 3 -1.53 *** -0.02 0 -3.92 *** -1.36
Malaysia h = 6 months 21 0.99 ** -0.76 ** 19 -10.92 *** 0.83
1 year 19 -8.38 *** 0.32
1.5 years 21 0.45 ** -0.77 ** 18 -3.79 ** -0.77
2 years 8 0.45 ** -0.68 *** 17 -3.30 *** -0.84
Mexico h = 6 months 11 -0.19 *** -0.39 14 0.16 ** 0.69
1 year 10 -0.12 *** -0.40 4 0.20 ** 0.98 ***
1.5 years 11 -0.14 *** -0.23 3 0.16 ** 0.77 **
2 years 11 -0.14 *** -0.14 20 -0.24 *** 0.26 *
Philippines h = 6 months 13 0.69 ** 0.05 8 2.32 *** -1.00 ***
1 year 23 0.89 ** 0.00 24 2.81 *** -0.89 ***
1.5 years 23 0.80 ** -0.07 9 1.11 ** -0.13
2 years 19 0.60 *** -0.09 4 1.19 *** -0.17
Poland h = 6 months 22 1.32 *** 0.42 12 2.65 *** -0.68
1 year 17 1.35 *** 0.47 *** 11 3.12 ** -0.96
1.5 years 11 1.17 *** 0.46 *** 9 4.13 *** 0.67
2 years 14 0.45 *** 0.41 *** 9 2.53 *** 0.10
Saudi Arabia h = 6 months 7 0.49 *** 0.44 ***
1 year 6 0.41 *** 0.39 ***
1.5 years 3 0.41 *** 0.46 ***
2 years 0 0.34 *** 0.49 ***
Taiwan h = 6 months 24 2.52 *** -1.20 *** 19 5.78 ** -7.83 ***
1 year 24 1.92 *** -0.72 ** 17 7.54 *** -7.93 ***
1.5 years 24 1.61 *** -0.46 ** 14 7.57 ** -4.41 ***
2 years 21 1.21 *** -0.49 *** 16 4.18 ** 0.38
Source: author's estimates
Note:  (***), (**), (*): statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence.
Not significant
Specification as in Eq. (4)








 Table 10: Robustness check - Pseudo out-of-sample MSFEs (using a 3-year out-of-sample period)
EME   
AR(p )
US   
AR(p )
US   
EME
EME   
AR(p )
US   
AR(p )
US   
EME
Hong Kong 0.95 … … 1.27 0.88 0.69
(0.14) (0.95) (0.50) (0.50)
India 0.59 *** … … 0.82 *** 0.46 ** 0.56 *
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.06)
Malaysia 1.28 … … … 0.95 …
(0.75) (0.20)
Mexico 1.06 … … 1.59 1.74 1.09
(0.48) (0.93) (0.99) (0.80)
Philippines 0.79 *** 1.17 1.48 1.08 0.60 0.56
(0.01) (0.73) (0.65) (0.99) (0.50) (0.30)
Saudi Arabia 1.31 0.83 *** 0.63 ***
(0.98) (0.00) (0.00)
Singapore 0.97 … … 2.06 7.55 3.67
(0.16) (0.96) (0.97) (0.93)
South Africa 0.87 * 0.81 *** 0.93 0.94 * 0.67 ** 0.72 *
(0.10) (0.00) (0.46) (0.09) (0.03) (0.08)
Source: author's estimates.
Notes: (… ) indicates that the MSFE was not calculated due to insignificant in-sample predictor.
            The p -value of the statistic DM, reported in parenthesis, is that of a one-sided test.
            (***), (**), (*): statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence.





Table 11: Robustness check - Pseudo out-of-sample MSFEs (yield curve vs. T-bill rate)
Brazil 0.42 Korea 0.69 Singapore 1.22
(0.15) (n/a) (0.91)
Czech Republic 0.95 Malaysia 0.84 ** South Africa 0.78 ***
(n/a) (0.05) (0.00)
Hong-Kong 1.11 Mexico 0.78 *** Taiwan 0.90
(n/a) (0.01) (n/a)
Hungary 1.01 Philippines 0.54 ***
(0.60) (0.00)
India 1.11 Poland 0.86 *
(0.59) (0.08)
Source: author's estimates.
Notes: The p-value of the statistic DM, reported in parenthesis, is that of a one-sided test.
            (***), (**), (*): statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence.









Brazil h = 6 months k = 5 0.31 k = 12 0.63
1 year 4 0.25 12 0.47
Hungary h = 6 months k = 12 -2.07 k = 14 -4.27
1 year 14 -2.03 12 -3.40
Malaysia h = 6 months k = 17 -0.25 k = 12 2.73
1 year 24 -0.18 12 1.77
Mexico h = 6 months k = 12 0.47 k = 17 -1.13
1 year 11 0.19 14 -1.09
Philippines h = 6 months k = 92 . 8 0 k = 92
1 year 5 2.33 5 2.33
Poland h = 6 months k = 10 1.62 k = 19 -3.58
1 year 10 1.48 14 -3.13
South Africa h = 6 months k = 12 0.99 k = 24 -1.44
1 year 12 1.11 20 -0.64
Note: Results significant at least at the 5% level of confidence, unless otherwise indicated.
Table 12: Robustness check - The spread of emerging sovereign bonds vis-à -vis US Treasuries as a predictor 
of emerging market inflation and growth














Exchange rate flexibility -1.13 ** -1.39 *
(0.06) (0.08)
Relative market liquidity -1.85 -3.92
(0.67) (0.38)
Average inflation and growth 
correlation with the US
0.26 -0.67
(0.91) (0.78)




Constant 2.83 *** 3.44 *** 2.50 *** 2.02 *** 5.01 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.03)
R
2 0.02 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.31
Obs. 14 14 14 14 14
Source: author's estimates.
1 Estimation by OLS. (**) and  (*) denote statistical significance at the 5% and 10% level of confidence, respectively.
  (***), (**), (*): statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence;  p-values are reported in parenthesis.
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